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Abstract—The congestion pricing is an efficient allocation 
approach to mediate demand and supply of network resources. 
Different from the previous pricing using Affine Marginal Cost 
(AMC), we focus on studying the game between network coding 
and routing flows sharing a single link when users are price 
anticipating based on an Average Cost Sharing (ACS) pricing 
mechanism. We characterize the worst-case efficiency bounds of 
the game compared with the optimal, i.e., the price-of anarchy 
(POA), which can be low bound 50% with routing only. When 
both network coding and routing are applied, the POA can be as 
low as 4/9. Therefore, network coding cannot improve the POA 
significantly under the ACS. Moreover, for more efficient use of 
limited resources, it indicates the sharing users have a higher 
tendency to choose network coding. 
Keywords-congestion pricing; Average Cost Sharing (ACS); 
network coding; POA 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The current Internet is frequent that a group of different 
users share the same link transforming information in a wide 
variety of real network situations. The congestion pricing, as an 
effective approach in terms of improving the efficiency of 
network resource allocation, is set to mediate demand and 
supply of network resources. 
Since the seminal paper by Ahlswede et al. [1], network 
coding has shown great potential for improving network 
throughput in communication networks. However, game 
theoretic analysis on the performance of network coding has 
received more and more attention recently, e.g., in [2]-[7]. All 
results in [2]-[4] focus on the case of intra-session network 
coding performed by jointly encoding multiple packets from 
the same user, whereas inter-session network coding encoding 
packets from different users is considered in [5-7]. Moreover, a 
game theoretic analysis for inter-session network coding of 
combining network coding and routing flows on a single 
bottleneck link is investigated in [5-7]. In addition, a key 
performance metric named the price of anarchy (POA) for 
analyzing the system, is the ratio between the total payoffs at 
the worst Nash equilibrium of this game and the efficient 
payoffs, i.e., the maximum feasible total payoffs. The total 
payoffs are denoted by aggregate surplus, i.e., aggregate utility 
less aggregate cost. Obviously, it indicates that a higher POA 
denotes a smaller efficiency loss. All the results in [7] are 
based on the Affine Marginal Cost (AMC) pricing mechanism 
similar to [8].  
An Average Cost Sharing (ACS) pricing mechanism noted 
by Vasilis Ntranos in [9] is more robust that users cannot 
benefit from merging or splitting their rates than the AMC 
mechanism generally, which is more reasonable and fairness to 
each sharing user. More specifically, both the number of 
sharing users and the total rates through the sharing link have 
been taken into consideration.  
In this paper, we focus on studying the game between 
network coding and routing flows sharing a single link when 
users are price anticipating based on the ACS pricing 
mechanism. The innovative design of ACS pricing function is 
affected by the sum of all users’ decisions and the total number 
of users sharing the same technique (network coding or 
routing). Each user’s cost share charged by network is 
proportional to its action (transmission rate). The network 
aggregate surplus is formulated by the total utility of all users 
minus the total network cost of them. The key contributions of 
this paper is as follows：1) A complete analysis of a sharing 
single link system with both network coding and routing flows 
is established based on ACS pricing mechanism. 2) POA is 
calculated under the two pricing circumstances, i.e., 
non-discriminatory pricing with routing-only users and 
discriminatory pricing with both network coding and routing.  
The following is the outline of the remainder of this paper. 
In Section II, we achieve the results of the average cost sharing 
pricing mechanism for a single link on resource allocation 
games with routing-only. Then the case when some users can 
jointly perform inter-session network coding will be considered 
with extended results in Section III. Finally, conclusions are 
discussed in Section IV.  
II. ACS PRICING MECHANISM ----ROUTING GAME 
A. Problem formulation 
In this section, we consider a framework with a single 
shared link       to allocate network capacity efficiently 
among a collection of   routing-only users, i.e., all data that 
node   receive are simply forwarded to node  , as shown in 
Fig. 1. The set of users is denoted by            . Each 
user     is endowed with a utility function        
depending on their desired data transmission rate    from its 
sender    to its receiver   . In addition, let      
 
    
denote the total rate allocated at the link, and the link is 
overloaded when the sum of rates   through it exceeds the 
fixed capacity   of the link. A cost share for the average 
queue experienced by user   is denoted by       . Therefore, 
       is the reduction in user  ’s utility due to the network 
congestion. Generally,        and        are measured in 
the same monetary units. Moreover,        is the monetary 
value to each user   of a rate allocation   , while        is 
a monetary cost for congestion at the link to each user   of a 
rate allocation   charged by network, respectively. 
 
Figure 1.   routing-only users sharing a single link 
Next, we make the following assumptions regarding 
       and       . 
Assumption 1: There is a differentiable, convex, and 
non-decreasing price function      over    , with 
       and        as    , and we suppose the 
price function is linear for simplicity. 
Assumption 2: For each transmission rate     ,    , 
the cost function for the     user is modeled as        
          subjected to    . Here        is convex and 
non-decreasing. Moreover, let          denote the cost 
incurred at the link when the total allocated rate is    . 
Similarly,          is also convex and non-decreasing. 
Assumption 3: For each    , utility function        is 
concave, non-negative, strictly increasing, and differentiable. 
Moreover, for simplicity and generality, suppose the utility 
function is also linear for all users. That is            , 
     , where utility parameter      for all users. 
In general, since the utility functions are local to the users 
and are not known at each link, the efficient resource allocation 
needs to be done via pricing. Therefore, the pricing mechanism 
applied is very significant for the system. 
Proposition 1: Suppose assumption 1 holds. There exist 
two techniques for data transmission on the shared single link: 
network coding and routing. We define the following ACS 
pricing mechanism referring to [9]: 
   
    
  
 , (1) 
where    denotes the number of users sharing one of the two 
independent single links (routing or network coding), and 
     is the sum of rates for each user   through the single 
link with the same technique,           . 
Given the rate vector                 from the users, 
the capacity of single communication link       is supposed 
as    , then      
 
       . For simplicity and 
generality, we assume that                      
in the rest of this paper.  
In this scenario, we only take the routing into account. Thus 
we set a single scalable price for the shared link to all the 
routing users: 
        
   
 
   
 
 , (2) 
where      
 
      is the sum of rates from all the 
routing users,   is the number of routing users sharing the 
same link      . Obviously, the price is affected by the sum 
of all routing users’ rates and the total number of routing users 
sharing the same link. Furthermore, the cost of each user   
  for its transmission rate    is               . 
Efficiency is defined in terms of the aggregate value of a 
network allocation in [8]. Similarly, we also analyze the 
performance of the pricing mechanism from the point of 
efficient allocation, which can be characterized one via 
maximizing aggregate surplus as an optimal solution: 
 maximize                  , (3) 
 subject to     ,          (4) 
The above objective function (3) is referred as the 
aggregate surplus. 
Then we should consider the surplus of each user     
for a price       , where they will play a game to acquire a 
share of link because users are anticipating the effect of their 
rates on the resulting price. The notation     is denoted the 
vector of all rates chosen by users other than  . Then given 
   , each user   will choose      to maximize its surplus: 
                
                      
   ,        . (5) 
In fact, the decision made by user   depends on the rates 
selected by other users, leading to a resource allocation game 
among all routing users. A normal form of the game     is 
given as follows: 
                           , (6) 
where            is the set of players (sharing users), 
the rate    is the strategy of each player    , and 
                                          is the set of 
surplus functions that each player     wishes to maximize. 
Furthermore,  
                        
   
 
   
 
 . (7) 
Without loss of generality, for each user    , 
                       . Then we can infer that 
        
   
 
. In game    , each user     strategically 
selects its rate      to maximize its payoff function 
           . From this model we can conclude that there may 
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Price:  
exist such stable strategies, which are identified as Nash 
Equilibria. A system is said to be in a Nash Equilibrium when 
no individual user     can increase its own payoff by 
means of changing its strategy    ultimately. A Nash 
equilibrium of game     can be defined as a rate vector 
    , such that for all users    ,      , we have 
     
     
             
   . 
B. Nash Equilibrium and POA 
We first show that a Nash equilibrium exists for this game 
under the new average congestion pricing mechanism. The 
interested readers can find the proof with reference to [8]. 
Therefore, we achieve that  
(i) Game     always has a unique Nash equilibrium. 
(ii) Given    is an optimal solution for function (3) and 
   is a feasible Nash Equilibrium for game    , we want to 
get the character  
 minimize      
      
            
      
      
            
      
, (8) 
where    and    should satisfy        and      
 , respectively. From the given conditions 
       
   
    and 
     
 
     , the following inequality holds: 
 
      
             
      
      
             
      
 
       
         
  
          
       
                         
       
. (9) 
Proposition 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold, 
and that        , for some    . Also,         and 
         are assumed. We prove that     
 
 
. 
Proof: First, we show without loss of generality that 
             ,        obtained before, so it is obvious 
that                  . Subsequently, referring to [8], as 
known                , the optimal solution 
happens when the total rates (no more than fixed capacity 1) 
with all the   users existing are only allocated to user 1: 
    ,     ,     ,…,     , and     . 
Consequently, the maximal aggregate surplus is   
  
 
, when 
            
             
        , thus the optimal 
solution of function (3) is obtained. 
Next, the worst case occurs when the utility functions of the 
users are linear (Assumption 3). We then optimize over all 
games with linear utility functions to determine the worst case 
efficiency loss. The worst case of game     is to solve the 
optimization problem as follows: 
 minimize       
             
      , (10) 
where   
  is a Nash equilibrium for Game    . Because the 
surplus    is concave for fixed    , a vector   
  is a Nash 
equilibrium if and only if the following first-order conditions 
are satisfied for each  , 
           
   
 
       
   
 
       
   
           
     
   
  ,(11) 
           
     
   
 
   
 
 
    
 
,     , (12) 
         
   
 
,     . (13) 
Given         
  
 
 before, then      is concluded. 
To find the solution to (10), none of the user can be allocated 
the total capacity. We use these conditions to investigate the 
efficiency loss when users are price anticipating. Specifically, 
we are interested in comparing the aggregate surplus achieved 
at a Nash equilibrium with the aggregate surplus achieved at a 
optimal solution as (8). As a result, from (12) and the given 
condition                , it indicates that 
             . Therefore, according to the 
Chebyshev's sum inequality, we have 
      
  
    
 
 
     
 
        
       , (14) 
where     
 
        
  
 
 owing to (12), and it is dependent 
on the total rates through the single link. Therefore, we obtain 
the aggregate surplus under the worst case of Nash Equilibria 
for game    :       
            
       
    
  
. 
Hence, the POA, i.e., the efficiency boundary is  
     
      
            
      
      
            
      
 
    
  
  
  
 
. (15) 
For   
   
  
  
 
  
   
  
, when    , the POA approaches 
   , as required. The worst case efficiency loss is always 
exactly 50% for any ACS price function by an appropriate 
choice of utility and price functions. Furthermore, the 
corresponding numerical results on POA for 100 randomly 
sharing users with   approaching to 1 are shown in Fig. 3. ■ 
III. ACS PRICING MECHANISM ---- NETWORK CODING AND 
ROUTING GAME 
We also concentrate on the impacts on the selfish users 
with the ACS pricing mechanism when inter-session network 
coding is applied. Without loss of simplicity and generality, we 
only have considered two users performing the inter-session 
network coding as shown in Fig. 2.  
The network model is similar to that in Fig. 1, except two 
aspects: 1) the two direct side links:         from source 
node    to destination node   , and         from source 
node    to destination node   ; 2) shared single link divided 
into two independent single links from the view of two data 
transmission techniques (network coding and routing). In this 
scenario, the first and the last users (i.e., users 1 and  ) can 
perform inter-session network coding. Let    and    denote 
the packets transmitted from sender nodes    and   , 
respectively. The intermediate node   can encode packets 
   and    together, and then send the encoded packet, 
denoted by      , towards node   (and from there 
towards    and   ) through the network coding link. Given 
the remedy data    from the side link         and the 
remedy data    from the side link        , nodes    and 
   can decode the encoded packets that they receive. In fact, 
nodes    and    can both decode    and   . What’s 
more, the packet    without encoded is simply transmitted 
from node   to node   through the routing link. Here    
and    denote the data rates of source nodes    and   , 
respectively. We have       by independent users 1 and 
  in general. 
 
Figure 2. A single link shared by two independent flows, i.e., network 
coding and routing. Users 1 and   perform inter-session network coding.  
Assumption 4: The side links         and         in 
Fig. 2 always have zero cost and impose zero prices. 
A. Discriminatory prices 
In contrast to the routing-only situation in section II, we 
establish two discriminatory prices   and   for network 
coding and routing users for each independent single link, 
respectively, as displayed in Fig. 2. Both the two prices are 
based on the ACS pricing mechanism in proposition 1. 
Under such congestion network setting in Fig. 2, the 
routing group is combined by     (assume there exist 
    users) routing-only users and the one between 1 and   
with rate            (i.e., user 1, for the assumption 
                ). In addition, they transmit data 
through the shared routing link at rate    for each user 
          and at                         for 
user 1, respectively. As a result, the price for routing users 
following the ACS pricing mechanism is 
        
               
   
             
   
 , (16) 
where                
   
              is the sum of 
rates through the routing link as shown in Fig. 2, and the 
variable     is the number of users forwarding data on the 
routing link, i.e.,        . 
Afterwards, the price for network coded users following the 
same ACS pricing mechanism is defined as 
        
          
 
    
  
 
 , (17) 
where            is the sum of rates through the network 
coding link, the constant 2 is the number of users transmitting 
data on the network coding link, i.e., users 1 and  . 
In particular, the aggregate data rate is no more than the 
fixed capacity 1 over the routing link of the single link ( ,  ), 
i.e.,                
   
       as a whole. Clearly, 
the benefit of the network coding is to reduce the traffic load 
on the shared link       (thus reducing the link cost) and 
save the resources while achieving the same rates. 
Moreover, we want to investigate the interactions between 
the two discriminatory prices depending on the changes of 
rates and the total number of users. Then we define  
   
    
    
 
       
       
. (18) 
From the equation, we can see that   is only affected by 
the total number   of users, the total rates   through the 
whole link and the minimal network coding rate   . Owing to 
the assumption that                     , we 
can conclude that      
 
 when    , and       
when    . Therefore, compared with [5] there exist wider 
ranges for   because of the number of sharing users and their 
choices between network coding and routing. 
B. Game and POA 
There are enough conditions to define the resource 
allocation game     among network coding and routing flows 
as follows: 
                           , (19) 
where            is the set of players (sharing users), 
   is the strategy of each player    , and               
                                        is the set of 
surplus functions that each player     wishes to maximize. 
The network coding users 1 and   have 
                                      , (20) 
                          . (21) 
While each routing user           has 
                          . (22) 
We also analyze the performance of two discriminatory 
prices by efficient allocation, and maximize the aggregate 
surplus as an optimal solution similar in (3). According to the 
similar proof in section II, the optimal solution of game     
occurs when the variable          is allocated to all the 
users. That means 
        
 
           
       
 
   
    
 . (23) 
If    
 
   , the maximal value of        
 
    is     . 
It implies the optimal rate allocation that           
and    
   
     , which means the shared link only occupied 
by network coding users transmitting their data.  
If  
 
     , the maximal value of        
 
    is 
            
       
 when      
 
  
. By (11) and (12) in II, the 
worst case is identified by finding the worst Nash Equilibrium 
Routing:               
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Price:  
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according to the equations (20), (21) and (22) in game    . 
Furthermore, the utility parameters for a Nash Equilibrium are 
   
           
   
,        for network coding user 1 and 
user   respectively, and    
   
   
        
   
 for each routing 
user          . 
Due to the above equations of    for each user    , we 
can infer that    
   
    
        
   
. The first-order derivative 
equation                     is non-decreasing because of the 
concave function       . To obtain the worst case of game 
   , the same objective problem as in (10) is required to be 
solved. In this paper, only two exceptional cases at     and 
    are analyzed in detail. 
First, we consider the situation at    , only user 1 and 
user 2, for            , the aggregate surplus is: 
       
 
              
 . We obtain    
  
 
, and 
 
 
   owing to the given assumptions. Finally, the worst case 
is        when     . 
Then we consider the other situation at    . We also 
suppose                     , and then 
                    for the concave utility 
function, so we can get the following range 
 
   
 
 
 
 
       
      
. 
With Chebyshev's sum inequality in (14), we can solve the 
aggregate surplus:        
 
    
         
      
 
       
 
   
. 
Thus we can see that the worst case is a quadric equation of 
action   . For simplicity, let       ,
      
   
     , 
we denote      
    
      
 
   
   
. When the number of sharing 
users    ,      is non-decreasing, it indicates that 
            
      
   
 . Then we can obtain the worst 
case of game     is the aggregate surplus 
   
      
 
  
 
 when 
   . 
As mentioned above, we summarize the POA situations of 
different numbers of users sharing the single link when both 
network coding and routing are applied. The proof in section II 
can be as references. 
When    ,  
 
 
     , then 
     
 
 
. (24) 
When    , 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
, then 
     
 
 
. (25) 
The above results extend the POA for routing-only flows in 
section II. In addition, the POA boundary is decreasing from  
 
 
to  
 
 as the sharing users increasing from 2 to a quite large 
number with proper choices of price and utility parameters,   
and  , respectively. Compared with the routing-only boundary 
 
 
 in section II, it suggests that network coding cannot improve 
the POA remarkably with the ACS. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
This paper considers the ACS pricing model dealing with 
network resource allocation problem between two independent 
techniques for data transmission, i.e., routing and network 
coding. Without loss of generality, we focus on the case where 
two out of     users performing inter-session network 
coding in a sharing single link. The results are dramatically 
different from the case when the AMC is applied. The ACS 
pricing mechanism can be utilized to represent both the 
non-discriminatory pricing with routing-only users and 
discriminatory pricing with both routing and network coding 
simultaneously. We show that the choice of different 
transmission techniques and the number of sharing users can 
affect on the exact value of POA, but actually network coding 
cannot improve the POA obviously. Therefore, for more 
efficient use of limited resources, it indicates the sharing users 
have a higher tendency to choose network coding. 
 
Figure 3. POA of 100 randomly routing-only sharing users. 
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